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Don’t Rush to Abandon a Suspicion-Based Standard 
for Searches of Public School Students 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, the Supreme Court has adhered to two basic princi-
ples in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. “First, warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically de-
lineated and well-recognized exceptions.”2 Second, highly intrusive 
searches, conducted under the warrant requirement or one of its ex-
ceptions, are reasonable “only on a showing of probable cause to be-
lieve that a crime has been committed and that evidence of the crime 
will be found in the place to be searched.”3 
However, prior to 1985, public school teachers and administra-
tors were not subject to these Fourth Amendment requirements. Ac-
cording to the doctrine of in loco parentis, teachers and administra-
tors acted under the authority of the parent, not of the state.4 As  
 
 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 2. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 354 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (allowing a 
search on less than probable cause where a reasonable suspicion exists that the search will find 
evidence of a crime); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (allowing a search even absent a 
warrant or probable cause if a reasonable belief exists that the individual is armed and danger-
ous); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding that searches conducted in the 
absence of a warrant or probable cause are per se unreasonable). 
 3. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 354–55 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
479 (1963); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). 
 4. See Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970, no writ) (holding 
that no government search had occurred because the school administrator was acting in loco 
parentis; because the parent does not exercise governmental power, neither does the principal 
acting in the place of the parent). 
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Blackstone explained in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, a 
parent  
may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to 
the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, 
and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his 
charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to 
answer the purposes for which he is employed.5 
In 1985, the Supreme Court, in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,6 held that 
the actions of public school teachers and administrators are governed 
by the Fourth Amendment. At issue in T.L.O. was a high school ad-
ministrator’s search of a student’s purse to obtain evidence confirm-
ing a teacher’s direct observation that a girl was smoking in a lava-
tory in violation of school rules.7 The T.L.O. Court found the 
traditional interpretation of in loco parentis to be “in tension with 
contemporary reality and the teachings of this Court.”8 Specifically, 
the Court held that the concept of in loco parentis is not entirely 
“‘consonant with compulsory education laws’”9 and is inconsistent 
with other Supreme Court decisions treating school officials as state 
actors for purposes of the Due Process and Free Speech Clauses of 
the Constitution.10 Further, the Court had previously held that stu-
dents do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at the school house 
gate.”11 Based upon these considerations, the Court held that public 
school teachers and administrators are subject to the limits of the 
Fourth Amendment and “cannot claim the parents’ immunity from 
the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.”12  
 
 5. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453. 
 6. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 7. See id. at 328. 
 8. Id. at 336. 
 9. Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977)). 
 10. See id. 
 11. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) 
(referring to First Amendment rights of “freedom of speech or expression”). 
 12. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985). In explaining its holding, the 
Court wrote: 
We have held school officials subject to the commands of the First Amendment . . . 
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If school authorities are 
state actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression 
and due process, it is difficult to understand why they should be deemed to be exer-
cising parental rather that public authority when conducting searches of their stu-
dents. More generally, the Court has recognized that ‘the concept of parental dele-
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Even so, the Supreme Court upheld the search at issue because, 
although school teachers and administrators are subject to the re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment, the unique circumstances 
and setting of a school require a diminution of Fourth Amendment 
requirements. The Court explained that “the preservation of order 
and a proper educational environment . . . in the schools requires a 
certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures,” which 
entails “some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public 
authorities are ordinarily subject.”13 Therefore, the Court held that 
neither the warrant requirement14 nor the probable cause require-
ment15 apply to a search of a public school student by a school 
teacher or administrator. “Rather,” the Supreme Court wrote, “the 
legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reason-
ableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”16 The Supreme 
Court concluded that a search of a public school student by a teacher 
or administrator would be constitutionally permissible “when there 
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up  
 
 
gation’ as a source of school authority is not entirely ‘consonant with compulsory 
education laws.’ Igrahm v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1407, 51 
L.Ed.2d 711 (1977). Today’s public school officials do not merely exercise author-
ity voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act in further-
ance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies. . . . In carrying out 
searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, school officials 
act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they 
cannot claim the parents’ immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 336-37 (citations omitted). 
 13. Id. at 339-40. 
 14. See id. at 340. The Court explained: 
The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school environment: re-
quiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infrac-
tion of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the mainte-
nance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools. . . . 
[W]e hold today that school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a 
student who is under their authority. 
Id. 
 15. See id. at 341. The Court stated: 
[T]he accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial 
need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools 
does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on 
probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating 
the law. 
 Id. 
 16. Id. at 341. 
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evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or 
the rules of the school.”17 
The Supreme Court recently expanded upon T.L.O. in Vernonia 
School District 47J v. Acton (“Vernonia”).18 In Vernonia, the Court 
upheld a suspicionless search program for public school students who 
wished to participate in interscholastic athletics.19 This decision has 
been criticized as being too quick to abandon a suspicion-based drug 
testing search regime, thereby depriving students of their only re-
maining Fourth Amendment protection—the New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
individualized suspicion requirement.20  
Since Vernonia, several school districts have moved to implement 
suspicionless drug testing programs for various groups of students. 21 
Several of these programs have been challenged, with the courts di-
vided on whether suspicionless mandatory drug testing violates stu-
dents’ Fourth Amendment rights. This Note examines Todd v. Rush 
County Schools,22 a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision that re-
lied upon Vernonia to uphold a warrantless, suspicionless urinalysis 
testing program for public school students who wish to participate in 
extracurricular activities. Part II discusses Vernonia School District 
47J v. Acton.23 Part III presents the facts of Todd v. Rush County 
Schools and reviews the reasoning behind the decision. Part IV ad-
dresses several problems with the application of Vernonia to Todd. 
That Part also discusses the suspicion-based standard and its ability 
to fulfill the purposes of a suspicionless program while protecting 
students’ privacy interests in a public school context. Part V con-
cludes that the Vernonia holding should be limited to its facts and 
that a suspicion-based standard would best preserve students’ consti-
tutional rights while protecting the government’s ability to maintain 
order and a proper educational environment in public schools. 
 
 17. Id. at 342. 
 18. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
 19. See id. at 665. 
 20. See id. at 680-81 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
342 (1985); Wayne R. LaFave, Computers, Urinals, and the Fourth Amendment: Confessions of 
a Patron Saint, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2553, 2571-75 (1996). 
 21. See, e.g., Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984, 985 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc 
denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824 (1998); Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 
v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Colo. 1998) (en banc). 
 22. 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
525 U.S. 824 (1998). 
 23. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
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II. VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 47J V. ACTON24 
In Vernonia, the Supreme Court upheld a drug testing program 
that called for random urinalysis drug testing of students who wished 
to participate in interscholastic athletic programs. In doing so, the 
Court balanced students’ privacy interests against the government 
interest of maintaining order and a proper educational environment 
in public schools by deterring drug use among the nation’s school 
children. Initially, the Court explained the problems in the school 
district: 
[A] large segment of the student body, particularly those involved 
in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion. Disciplinary 
actions had reached “epidemic proportions.” The coincidence of an 
almost three-fold increase in classroom disruptions and disciplinary 
reports along with the staff’s direct observations of students using 
drugs or glamorizing drug and alcohol use led the administration 
to the inescapable conclusion that the rebellion was being fueled by 
alcohol and drug abuse as well as the student’s [sic] misperceptions 
about the drug culture.25 
The Court noted that “[n]ot only were athletes included among the 
drug users but, as the District Court found, athletes were the leaders 
of the drug culture.”26 
In its analysis, the Court first considered the privacy interest of 
public school students. It stated that “[c]entral, in our view, to the 
present case is the fact that the subjects of the Policy are (1) children, 
who (2) have been committed to the temporary custody of the State 
as schoolmaster.”27 Although the Court, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., held 
that school officials “cannot claim the parents’ immunity from the 
strictures of the Fourth Amendment,”28 school officials possess a 
“custodial and tutelary” power that “permit[s] a degree of supervi-
sion and control that could not be exercised over free adults.”29 Fur-
ther, because public school students must submit to various physical 
exams and vaccinations, “students within the school environment 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 649 (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. 
Or. 1992)). 
 26. Id. (citation omitted). 
 27. Id. at 654. 
 28. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985). 
 29. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655. 
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have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population 
generally.”30 Concerning students who participate in interscholastic 
athletics, the Supreme Court found persuasive the fact that student-
athletes, because of the nature of athletics, have a lesser expectation 
of privacy than the general student body.31 Additionally, student-
athletes voluntarily choose to participate in interscholastic athletics, 
thereby subjecting themselves to a high degree of regulation.32 
The Vernonia Court continued by considering the governmental 
interest in preservation of order and a proper educational environ-
ment in public schools by deterring drug use among public school 
students. This interest did not need to meet some “fixed, minimum 
quantum of governmental concern,” the Court reasoned, but merely 
had to be “important enough to justify the particular search at 
hand.”33 The Court found that the government interest in the edu-
cational environment of public schools was important enough to jus-
tify the search at issue in Vernonia, because “the effects of a drug-
infested school are visited not just upon the users but upon the en-
tire student body and faculty, as the educational process is dis-
rupted.”34 Further, the Court explained that with student athletes in 
particular there was a need to respond to “the risk of immediate 
physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he is playing his 
sport.”35 The Supreme Court found that the program was an effi-
cient means to achieve the governmental interest because it both de-
terred drug use among athletes and worked against the wide-ranging 
 
 30. Id. at 657 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 31. See id. at 657. The Court explained: 
School sports are not for the bashful. They require “suiting up” before each practice 
or event, and showering and changing afterwards. Public school locker rooms, the 
usual sites for these activities, are not notable for the privacy they afford. The locker 
rooms in Vernonia are typical: No individual dressing rooms are provided; shower 
heads are lined up along a wall, unseparated by any sort of partition or curtain; not 
even all the toilet stalls have doors. As the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit has noted, there is “an element of ‘communal undress’ inherent in 
athletic participation.” 
Id. (quoting Schaill ex rel. Kross v. Tippecanou County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th 
Cir. 1988)). 
 32. See id. (“[S]tudents who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to 
expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy.” (citations omitted)). 
 33. Id. at 661. 
 34. Id. at 662. 
 35. Id. 
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drug problem in the district.36 The Court concluded that because of 
the greatly decreased expectation of privacy among student-athletes 
and the overwhelming government interest in deterring drug use 
among the nation’s school children the testing program was consti-
tutional. 
III. TODD V. RUSH COUNTY SCHOOLS 
A. Facts 
In August 1996, the Rush County, Indiana, School Board ap-
proved a random, suspicionless drug testing program. In order to 
participate in any extracurricular activity or drive to and from school, 
the student and a parent or guardian had to consent to the student 
being tested for drugs, alcohol, or tobacco in random, unannounced 
urinalysis examinations.37 Extracurricular activities included “athletic 
teams, Student Council, Foreign Language Clubs, Fellowship of 
Christian Athletes, Future Farmers of America Officers, and the Li-
brary Club.”38 Following the implementation of the program, the 
parents of four students refused to sign the consent form, thereby 
barring the students from participating in extracurricular activities.39 
These parents brought suit claiming that the program violated the 
students’ Fourth Amendment rights. On cross motions for summary 
judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Indiana, the court granted the school district’s motion for 
summary judgment and denied the students’ motion.40 The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the grant of summary judgment for 
the district and ruled that random drug testing of students participat-
ing in extracurricular activities did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.41 The Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari.42 
 
 36. See id. at 663. 
 37. See Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984, 984 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 
139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824 (1998). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Prior to refusing to participate in the drug testing program, the plaintiff students 
had participated in extracurricular activities through membership in the Library Club, Future 
Farmers of America, and videotaping the football team. See id. 
 40. See Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 801 (S.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d, 133 
F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824 
(1998). 
 41. Todd, 133 F.3d at 984. 
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B. Reasoning 
Relying on Vernonia, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
that students who participate in extracurricular activities have a de-
creased expectation of privacy. The court based this conclusion on 
the finding that “Fourth Amendment rights . . . are different in pub-
lic schools than elsewhere”43 and emphasized that “the testing policy 
was undertaken in furtherance of the school district’s ‘responsibili-
ties, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children 
entrusted to its care.’”44 Most important, the court emphasized the 
fact that “[students] are required to submit to random drug testing 
only as a condition of participation in an extracurricular activity”45 in 
which they have voluntarily chosen to participate. Although the 
court recognized that extracurricular activities “‘are considered valu-
able to the school experience, and [that] participation may assist a 
student in getting into college,’” it noted that “extracurricular activi-
ties, like athletics, ‘are a privilege at the High School.’”46 
The district court relied heavily upon the governmental interest 
of “[d]eterring drug use by our Nation’s schoolchildren”47 to find 
that the program at issue in Todd did not violate students’ Fourth 
Amendment Rights. The court of appeals agreed. 
The plague of illicit drug use which currently threatens our nation’s 
schools adds a major dimension to the difficulties the schools face 
in fulfilling their purpose—the education of our children. If the 
schools are to survive and prosper, school administrators must have 
reasonable means at their disposal to deter conduct which substan-
tially disrupts the school environment.48 
Because the “school years are the time when the physical, psycho-
logical, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe,”49 the school 
 
 42. See Todd v. Rush County Sch., 525 U.S. 824 (1998). 
 43. Todd, 133 F.3d at 986 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 
656 (1995)). 
 44. Id. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656). 
 45. Id. (quoting Schaill ex rel. Kross v. Tippecanou County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 
1319 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
 46. Id. (quoting Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 803 (S.D. Ind. 1997)). 
 47. Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 806 (S.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d, 133 
F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824 
(1998) (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661). 
 48. Todd, 133 F.3d at 986 (quoting Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1324). 
 49. Id. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661). 
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district had an interest in deterring student drug use through a drug 
testing program. The court also felt that extending the Vernonia 
framework to include extracurricular activities was justified because 
the “linchpin”50 of the program was to protect the health of stu-
dents, and the program was “sufficiently similar”51 to the program 
upheld in Vernonia. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Although the Seventh Circuit held in Todd that the outcome of 
the case was governed by Vernonia, the court did not adhere to the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning and was too quick to deprive students of 
their only remaining Fourth Amendment protection: the New Jersey 
v. T.L.O. individual suspicion requirement.52 Part A discusses the 
court’s misapplication of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton to the 
circumstances present in Todd v. Rush County Schools. Part B sug-
gests that a reasonable suspicion requirement for searches of public 
school students preserves students’ remaining constitutional rights 
while still allowing school teachers and administrators the latitude 
needed to maintain order and a proper educational environment in 
public schools. 
A. Suspicionless Testing Programs Directed at Students Participating 
in Extracurricular Activities 
The Todd court ignored the Supreme Court’s emphasis on stu-
dent-athletes’ greatly decreased expectation of privacy and placed too 
much emphasis on what it perceived to be the voluntary nature of 
extracurricular activities. Further, the extreme circumstances that jus-
tified the suspicionless search program in Vernonia were not present 
in Todd. 
1. Unwarranted and unjustified expansion of Vernonia School 
District 47J v. Acton to include students not participating in athletics 
In Vernonia, the Supreme Court found it dispositive that the 
students targeted by the testing program (1) had an expectation of 
privacy of an even lesser degree than nonathlete students and (2) 
 
 50. Id. at 986. 
 51. Id. at 987. 
 52. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985). 
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voluntarily chose to participate in interscholastic athletics. In addi-
tion to the element of “communal undress” present in athletic locker 
rooms, athletes at Vernonia’s public schools were required to submit 
to a preseason physical exam (which included producing a urine 
sample), acquire adequate insurance coverage or sign an insurance 
waiver, maintain a grade point average above a minimum level, and 
comply with rules of training, conduct, and dress. The Vernonia 
court concluded that “students who voluntarily participate in school 
athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and 
privileges, including privacy.”53 Finally, the Supreme Court empha-
sized the substantial psychological and physical risks posed to ath-
letes by drug use: “[I]t must not be lost sight of that this program is 
directed more narrowly to drug use by school athletes, where the risk 
of immediate physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he 
is playing his sport is particularly high.”54 
Although the testing program at issue in Todd sought to include 
student participants in all extracurricular activities, not just interscho-
lastic athletics, the court of appeals found that “the reasoning com-
pelling drug testing of athletes also applies to testing of students in-
volved in extracurricular activities. Certainly successful extracurricular 
activities require healthy students.”55 It upheld the trial court’s con-
clusion that, despite the increased privacy intrusions and regulations 
inflicted upon participants in athletics, “any perceived differences be-
tween the student athletes in Vernonia and the nonathlete extracur-
ricular participants in this case turn out to be more ethereal than 
real.”56  
This reasoning ignores the fact that athletes are subjected, as 
noted in Vernonia, to even greater intrusions of privacy than the 
general student body or participants in nonathletic extracurricular ac-
 
 53. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) (citations omitted). 
 54. Id. at 662. The Supreme Court noted that drugs have both psychological and physi-
cal effects on athletes. Included among the psychological effects are impairment of judgment, 
slow reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of pain. The physical effects include an 
artificially induced heart rate increase, peripheral vasoconstriction, blood pressure increase, 
masking of the normal fatigue response, irregular blood pressure responses, a reduction in the 
oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood, and possible coronary artery spasms and myocardial in-
farction. See id. 
 55. Todd, 133 F.3d at 986. 
 56. Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 806 (S.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d, 133 
F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824 
(1998) (emphasis added). 
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tivities. Certainly there is no remarkable element of communal un-
dress present for participants in the Library Club or Future Farmers 
of America. The court of appeals comes distressingly close to author-
izing blanket, random, suspicionless searches of all public school stu-
dents based upon the lesser expectation of privacy held by students 
in general.57 In Vernonia, the Supreme Court cautiously avoided this 
result by emphasizing the lesser privacy expectation of student ath-
letes as opposed to the general student body.58 
It is difficult to reconcile the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Todd 
with a statement from Schaill ex rel. Kross v. Tippecanoe County 
School Corp. (“Schaill”),59 a Seventh Circuit decision, relied upon as 
controlling authority by the Todd court. In Schaill, the Seventh Cir-
cuit upheld a random, suspicionless drug testing program for partici-
pants in athletics based on athletes’ decreased expectation of pri-
vacy.60 The court stated that “we believe that sports are quite 
distinguishable from almost any other activity. Random testing of 
athletes does not necessarily imply random testing of band members 
or the chess team.”61 
Additionally, the district court in Rush, attempted to analogize 
the Vernonia to the Rush County testing program by emphasizing 
the perceived voluntary nature of extracurricular activities. 
“[E]xtracurricular activities, like sports, are voluntary activities which 
submit the students to extra rules and regulations. Participation in 
extracurricular programs is voluntary and a privilege; any student 
joining these activities is subject to regulation beyond that of a non-
participant.”62 Although the district court spoke generally of “extra 
rules and regulations” attendant to extracurricular activities, it did 
 
 57. Notably, the Eighth Circuit, in Miller ex rel. Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574 (8th 
Cir. 1999), recently upheld the constitutionality of a school district’s random urinalysis testing 
program for all students in grades seven through twelve, based upon the lesser expectation of 
privacy held by public school students. See id. at 578-79. The decision was later vacated as 
moot because the plaintiff-student was no longer a student in the school district. See id. at 582. 
 58. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657 (“By choosing to ‘go out for the team,’ [student ath-
letes] voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed 
on students generally.”); see also 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §10.11(b) at 
821 (3d ed. 1996). 
 59. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 60. See id. at 1310. 
 61. Id. at 1319 (footnote omitted). 
 62. Todd v. Rush County Sch.,  983 F. Supp. 799, 806 (S.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d, 133 
F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824 
(1998). 
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not specify any particular rules or regulations enforced upon students 
participating in nonathletic extracurricular activities such as the Li-
brary Club, Future Farmers of America.  
Further, the district court ignored the very likely situation of a 
student, as part of a graded class, being required to participate in an 
extracurricular activity.63 In addition, invaluable experience is gained 
through extracurricular activities, and college and university admis-
sion committees place strong emphasis on extracurricular activities.64 
Although this situation is not identical to that in which students are 
required to participate in an extracurricular activity as part of a 
graded class, “the reality for many students who wish to pursue post-
secondary educational training and/or professional vocations requir-
ing experience garnered only by participating in extracurricular ac-
tivities is that they must engage in such activities.”65 
Finally, unlike the substantial and documented health risks posed 
by drug use to students participating in athletics, the court did not 
pinpoint an increased risk to students who use drugs and participate 
in the Library Club, band, or any of Rush County’s other nonath-
letic extracurricular activities.66 The court merely reasoned that 
“successful extracurricular activities require healthy students.”67 This 
is not a sufficient ground on which to deny nonathlete public school 
students what is, in essence, their only remaining Fourth Amend-
ment protection—the individualized suspicion requirement.68 Thus, 
where students who do not participate in athletics are the targets of 
the searches, the necessary decreased expectation of privacy that stu-
dent-athletes possess is not present to tip the scales in favor of allow-
ing suspicionless, mandatory drug testing. In those situations, a  
 
 
 63. See, e.g., Trinidad Sch. Dist. v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1110 (Colo. 1998) (en banc) 
(holding unconstitutional a school drug policy requiring consent to random drug tests in order 
to participate in extracurricular activities; student was required, as part of his for-credit instru-
mental music class, to participate in band, an extracurricular activity.). 
 64. See, e.g., Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984, 986 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc 
denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824 (1998). 
 65. Trinidad Sch. Dist., 963 P.2d at 1109 (emphasis added); see also Todd, 139 F.3d at 
573 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (“Exclusion of a high school student from all extracurricular activi-
ties deprives that student of a great deal of what the modern American high school has to offer 
in terms of academic and personal development.”). 
 66. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 67. Todd, 133 F.3d at 986. 
 68. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985). 
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suspicion-based standard should be used in order to allow students 
to retain their remaining Fourth Amendment protection. 
2. The absence of extreme circumstances similar to those present in 
Vernonia 
In its holding, the Supreme Court emphasized the unique and 
extreme circumstances present in the Vernonia schools. 
[A] large segment of the student body, particularly those involved 
in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion. Disciplinary 
problems had reached “epidemic proportions.” The coincidence of 
an almost three-fold increase in classroom disruptions and discipli-
nary reports along with the staff’s direct observations of students 
using drugs or glamorizing drug and alcohol use led the admini-
stration to the inescapable conclusion that the rebellion was being 
fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as the student’s [sic] mis-
perceptions about the drug culture.69 
The Court noted that “[n]ot only were athletes included among 
the drug users but, as the District Court found, athletes were the 
leaders of the drug culture.”70 Further, the Supreme Court upheld 
the testing regime largely because the program targeted the leaders 
of the drug culture at the schools.71 
In stark contrast to the circumstances in Vernonia, the district 
court in Todd found that “[t]he empirical evidence is not particularly 
indicative of drug, alcohol or tobacco use by a majority (or even a 
large minority) of the students,” and “[t]here also is very little to in-
dicate that students in extracurricular activities are ‘ringleaders’ of a 
drug rebellion, as in Vernonia.”72 Therefore, unlike Vernonia, the 
program in Todd did not work to eliminate a drug problem by tar-
geting the leaders of the “drug culture.” In short, there was nothing 
in Todd that would justify a suspicionless search program in the face 
of minimal evidence of a drug problem among the targets of those 
searches. 
 
 69. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649 (1995) (quoting Acton v. 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 786 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 663. 
 72. Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 805 (S.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d, 133 
F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824 
(1998). 
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B. The Superiority of an Individualized Suspicion Standard Where the 
Unique Circumstances of Vernonia are not Present 
Vernonia must not be interpreted as condoning anything but 
suspicionless searches of student-athletes who are known to be the 
leaders of a well-documented and extreme drug problem among the 
student body. When the unique circumstances of Vernonia are not 
present, an individualized suspicion standard, based upon the Su-
preme Court’s holding in New Jersey v. T.L.O., should be followed. 
In T.L.O., the Court held that a search of a public school student by 
a school official will be constitutionally permissible “when there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evi-
dence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or 
the rules of the school.”73 
1. A suspicion-based regime would be very effective in public schools 
As the Supreme Court has explained, the strong preference for 
an individualized suspicion requirement will only be disregarded 
when it is impractical or not feasible under the particular circum-
stances.74 Therefore, if an individualized suspicion requirement 
would be effective under the circumstances presented, the require-
ment should not be forsaken.75 The Supreme Court has consistently 
adhered to this tenet, only upholding suspicionless regimes where an 
individualized suspicion standard is clearly found to be ineffective 
and unworkable.76 
 
 73. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 (footnote omitted). 
 74. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 75. See id. 
 76. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989) 
(holding that because it is “not feasible to subject [customs] employees and their work product 
to the kind of day-to-day scrutiny that is the norm in more traditional office environments,” a 
suspicion requirement is impractical for searches of customs officials for drug impairment); Bell 
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 n.40 (1979) (holding that because observation needed to gain 
suspicion would cause “obvious disruption of the confidentiality and intimacy that these visits 
are intended to afford,” a suspicion requirement for searches of prisoners for smuggling follow-
ing contact visits is impracticable); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 
(1976) (“[A] requirement that stops on major inland routes always . . . based on reasonable 
suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the 
particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of 
illegal aliens”); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J.) (ob-
serving that because of the “conceded inapplicability” of the profile method of detecting hi-
jackers and the great number of plane travelers, suspicion-based searches of airport passengers’ 
carry-on luggage is impractical); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (holding 
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There is no reason for courts to depart from this well-established 
tenet because it is far from clear that an individual suspicion standard 
is ineffective and unworkable in the public school setting. Public 
school students are under constant supervision, scrutiny, and obser-
vation in hallways, parking lots, lunchrooms, classrooms, and locker 
rooms by administrators, teachers, coaches, and fellow students.77 
Teachers, administrators, and coaches in a public school context are 
in a position to observe and detect behavior sufficient to establish 
reasonable suspicion of conduct that is either criminal or in contra-
vention of school rules.78 Further, students often supply specific in-
formation about the activities of other students.79 Therefore, it ap-
pears that an individualized suspicion requirement would be very 
effective in the public school context. 
In contrast, the court of appeals in Todd v. Rush County Schools 
does not explain why a suspicion based regime would be impractical 
or compromise significant governmental and public concerns. The 
district court merely explains that Rush County Schools’ motivation 
for implementing the suspicionless program was subjective observa-
tions by a coach and an administrator that led them to believe that  
 
 
 
that “faulty wiring” and other safety code violations are not visible from outside the house, 
making suspicion requirement for searches of homes for code violations impracticable). 
 77. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 (“[A] proper educational environment requires close 
supervision of schoolchildren.”).  
[Public school students] spend the school hours in close association with each other, 
both in the classroom and during recreational periods. The students in a particular 
class often know each other and their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers have 
a degree of familiarity with, and authority over, their students that is unparalleled 
except perhaps in the relationship between parent and child. 
Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 678 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“In 
most schools, the entire pool of potential search targets—students—is under constant supervi-
sion by teachers and administrators and coaches, be it in classrooms, hallways, or locker 
rooms.” (citations omitted)). 
 78. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
 79. See In re C., 26 Cal. App.3d 320, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (reporting of student 
keeping drugs in locker); In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 1195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (report-
ing that student had taken some pills and appeared to be intoxicated); Commonwealth v. Sny-
der, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1364 (Mass. 1992) (reporting of student attempting to sell drugs); 
Berry v. State, 561 N.E.2d 832 (Ind. App. 1990) (reporting by students that another student 
was selling drugs); Commonwealth v. Carey, 554 N.E.2d 1199, 1200 (Mass. 1990) (reporting 
by students that another student had a gun); People v. Stewart, 313 N.Y.S.2d 253, 254-55 
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970) (reporting of student keeping drugs on person). 
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drug use was growing among the students of Rush County.80 In its 
short opinion, the court of appeals overlooked the fact that these 
subjective observations noted by the district court would most likely 
have given rise to reasonable suspicion of in-school drug use, thus 
justifying a search under a suspicion-based standard, while preserving 
students’ remaining constitutional rights. 
2. A suspicion-based regime can satisfy the government interest in 
deterring student drug use while better protecting students’ Fourth 
Amendment rights 
Although the Supreme Court is often very quick to proclaim that 
students do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at the school-
house gate,”81 an unjustified suspicionless search regime has just that 
effect.  It strips students of their only remaining Fourth Amendment 
protection—the individualized suspicion requirement.82 It is intuitive 
that, much like suspicion-based law enforcement, a public school 
suspicion-based regime would not be as effective as a mass, suspi-
cionless testing regime.83 But the price paid for the liberties enjoyed 
under the Fourth Amendment is sometimes high. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Arizona v. Hicks, a decision that found a search lack-
ing probable cause to be unreasonable, “there is nothing new in the 
realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality 
of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.”84 While a small few 
may slip through the cracks, the great majority of offenders will be 
caught under a suspicion-based search standard.85 A survey of the 
major Fourth Amendment cases concerning public schools demon-
strates that the evidence obtained through teacher and administrator 
observations of students is sufficient to warrant drug related searches 
under a suspicion-based standard.86  This would achieve the govern-
 
 80. See Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 803 (S.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d, 133 
F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824 
(1998). 
 81. Tinker v. Des Moines Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 82. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. 
 83. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 680 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 84. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987). 
 85. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 58, at § 10.11(b) at 812 (“[I]n most instances the evi-
dence of wrongdoing prompting teachers or principals to conduct searches is sufficiently de-
tailed and specific to meet the traditional probable cause test.”). 
 86. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 679 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that a teacher ob-
served small groups of students passing joints back and forth across the street at a restaurant 
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ment purposes of deterring student drug use and reducing the effects 
of drugs on the educational environment while at the same time en-
suring that public school students are not subject to unreasonable 
searches and seizures.87 
V. CONCLUSION 
Public school students, while within the “school house gate,” do 
not enjoy two of the Fourth Amendment’s traditional categorical 
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures: the warrant 
requirement and the probable cause requirement. Recently, courts 
have moved to deprive students of their only remaining Fourth 
Amendment protection—the New Jersey v. T.L.O. individualized sus-
picion requirement.88 
The holding of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, upholding 
a suspicionless testing program for students participating in inter-
scholastic athletics, should be limited to its unique circumstances and 
not used to support suspicionless regimes for other groups of stu-
dents or the general student body. For situations not akin to Verno-
nia, an individualized suspicion requirement for searches of students 
by teachers and administrators should be followed. Accordingly, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals erred in Todd by allowing random, 
suspicionless drug testing of students who participate in any extra-
curricular activity. An individualized suspicion-based standard can 
achieve the government interests in deterring student drug use and 
avoiding the effects of drugs on the educational environment while 
preserving students’ remaining Fourth Amendment protection. 
J. Nathan Jensen 
 
 
before school and during school hours; a group of students was caught skipping school and 
using drugs at one of the students’ houses; several students admitted drug use to school offi-
cials (some of them being caught with marijuana pipes); a clearly inebriated student presented 
himself to his teacher and had to be sent home; a student, who was observed dancing and sing-
ing at the top of his voice in the back of the classroom, was asked by a teacher what was going 
on and replied, “Well, I’m just high on life”; during a school road trip, the wrestling coach 
smelled marijuana smoke in a hotel room occupied by four wrestlers); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328 
(noting that a teacher directly observed students smoking in lavatory); Todd, 983 F. Supp. at 
803 (noting that teachers’ and administrators’ “subjective perception[s]” led them to believe 
there was a growing drug problem in the school district). 
 87. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 88. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. 
